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CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: AN
OPT-IN PROPOSAL
John Bronsteen*
The outcome of a class action binds all class members except the
few who take the trouble to opt out. This default rule enables plain-
tiffs' lawyers and defendants to settle class lawsuits on mutually bene-
ficial terms that exploit class members. Judges approve such settle-
ments because, among other things, they have a strong incentive to
clear their dockets. This article suggests changing the default rule so
that class settlements include only those who expressly assent to the
terms of the settlement by opting in. This change would be aimed at
removing the incentive to settle collusively, discouraging frivolous
class lawsuits, and rewarding those plaintiffs who have the most meri-
torious claims.
INTRODUCTION
A class action is perhaps the most powerful tool that plaintiffs can
wield.' It threatens defendants with the prospect of enormous judgments
against them,' and it attracts the best plaintiffs' lawyers to pursue those
judgments.' By pooling the claims of thousands or even millions of peo-
ple, it evens the playing field between individuals and the corporations
they accuse of wrongdoing.'
* Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. I thank Bruce Ackerman,
Douglas Baird, Mary Anne Case, Adam Cox, Elizabeth Emens, Richard Epstein, Owen Fiss, Douglas
Ginsburg, Philip Hamburger, Jenia Iontcheva, Richard Nagareda, Eric Posner, and Lior Strahilevitz
for their helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., Guy Halfteck, The Class Action as a Financial Call Option 3 (Harvard Law and
Economics Discussion Paper No. 466) (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=528043.
2. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65
FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 277 (1996) ("By amassing thousands, tens of thousands, and even hundreds of
thousands of claims in class actions, plaintiff lawyers have so changed the dynamics of tort litigation as
to be able to extract multi-million-dollar and billion-dollar settlements.
3. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Defeating Class Certification in Securities Fraud Actions, 22 REV.
LrrG. 405,410 (2003).
4. See Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("Where it is not economi-
cally feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of small individual suits
for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective redress unless they may employ the
class-action device.").
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Faced with this threat, a corporation typically will seek to settle the
lawsuit rather than risk a crushing award of damages by a jury to the
class.5 After the two sides negotiate the settlement, they send letters no-
tifying the class members of the terms of the agreement.6 If a class mem-
ber does not reply to the letter-and most do not 7-then the class mem-
ber will be included in the settlement,8 receiving whatever the defendant
has agreed to give her, and losing her right to bring her own lawsuit.9
This default rule gives rise to a problem that is widely bemoaned
but, as yet, unsolved: a defendant often colludes with the lawyer for the
plaintiffs to reach a settlement favorable to the colluders but unfavorable
to the class members.'" Collusive settlements benefit the defendant
(which insulates itself from future lawsuits by every class member) and
the plaintiffs' lawyer (who receives a hefty fee while avoiding the time,
expense, and uncertainty of a trial), but those settlements undercompen-
sate the class members by giving them less than the expected value of the
5. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103
COLUM. L. REv. 149, 151 (2003) ("Settlements, not judgments after trial, stand overwhelmingly as the
end result of actions certified to proceed on a classwide basis that are not resolved on dispositive mo-
tions." (citations omitted)).
6. Many class members probably never know that they are parties to a lawsuit at all. In some
class actions (those filed under Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2)), the absent class members are not entitled to
be notified of the lawsuit. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A). In others (those filed under Rule 23(b)(3)), the
absent class members must receive "the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort." FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B). But even this requirement insures only that letters are sent to some class members. Some
will be sent nothing; others will be sent a letter but will not receive it; and still others will receive a let-
ter but discard it without reading it, much less understanding it.
7. E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class
Action Litigation: Theoretical and Empirical Issues 22 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 04-
004, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=528146.
8. E.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 667 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[C]lass members, unlike indi-
vidual litigants in traditional lawsuits, are bound by the settlement even though they do not individu-
ally consent to its terms."), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367
(1996); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty
in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 381 (2000) ("Inevitably, some members of a
large class will never receive notice and cannot therefore be assumed to have consented even though
they will be bound by the judgment or settlement.").
9. See Patrick Woolley, Rethinking the Adequacy of Adequate Representation, 75 TEx. L. REV.
571, 611 (1997) ("[A] settlement could be viewed as a forced sale of the right to litigate...."); cf.
Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
858, 892 (1995) ("[T]here appears to be no absolute bar to preclusion of claims by those who do not
receive notice .... ").
10. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
669,714 (1986) ("Often, the plaintiff's attorneys and the defendants can settle on a basis that is adverse
to the interests of the plaintiffs. At its worst, the settlement process may amount to a covert exchange
of a cheap settlement for a high award of attorney's fees. Although courts have long recognized this
danger and have developed some procedural safeguards intended to prevent collusive settlements,
these reforms are far from adequate to the task."); Nagareda, supra note 5, at 163 ("A staple of the
class action literature is the recognition that class counsel might embrace a settlement inadequate for
all, many, or some class members....").
[Vol. 2005
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lawsuit. Perhaps more importantly, such settlements underdeter pro-
spective defendants from breaking the law."
There is wide agreement that this problem is both severe and preva-
lent.12 It has become the most important difficulty in the field of class ac-
tions. Indeed, it was perhaps the leading cause of the recent amend-
ments to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 Many
commentators have urged judges to scrutinize class settlements more
carefully, and to disallow the ones that dramatically underpay class
members. 4 The new amendments to Rule 23 adopt this approach. 5 But
the approach faces a daunting obstacle: judges' strong. incentive to clear
their dockets by approving these settlements. 6 Disallowing a settlement
creates the risk that the class action will go to trial, and class lawsuits are
11. E.g., Alon Harel & Alex Stein, Auctioning for Loyalty: Selection and Monitoring of Class
Counsel, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 69, 71 (2004) ("This misalignment of interests between the class
attorney and the class members is both manifestly unjust and inefficient. It is unjust because it does
not provide adequate remedy to the victims of wrongs; it is inefficient because it dilutes the deterrence
of corporate wrongdoers."); cf. Alexandra Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class Action Govern-
ance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 70 (2003) ("There are two substantive justifications for permitting groups to
litigate through the class action mechanism: compensation and deterrence.").
12. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Cli-
ents or Law, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 129, 156 (2001) ("[C]ollusion and inadequate representation are
rampant in class actions...."); Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail" Set-
tlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1389 (2000) (explaining
that many "[cilass actions.., provide fertile ground for collusion, according to critics"); Samuel Issa-
charoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 821 (1997) ("[T]he limited fund class ac-
tion provides tremendous strategic incentives for collusion."); see also Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v.
Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) ("That there is a potential for misuse of the class-action mechanism is
obvious.").
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 cmt. e (2003) ("Subdivision (e) is amended to strengthen the process
of reviewing proposed class-action settlements.... [Clourt review and approval are essential to assure
adequate representation of class members who have not participated in shaping the settlement.");
Edward Brunet, Class Action Objectors: Extortionist Free Riders or Fairness Guarantors, 2003 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 403, 472 (2003) ("The proposed amendments to Rule 23 are designed to strengthen the
problematic process of settlement review.").
14. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 485 (2000) ("[lit is judges who hold the key to improving the balance of good and ill
consequences of damage class actions."); James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtu-
ous, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 524 (1997) ("Simply stated, the courts must not only become more active in
their reviews but also must make the overall process more transparent."); Eisenberg & Miller, supra
note 7, at 39 ("[Olur study suggests that courts should be especially vigilant to police the adequacy of
counsel in class cases...."); Nagareda, supra note 5, at 168 (noting that among "the developments in
class action law over the past decade" are "heightened demands for judicial scrutiny of class settle-
ments"); see also Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciar-
ies and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1239, 1245 (2003) ("Noting that presiding judges are the
self-proclaimed 'fiduciaries,' 'agents,' or 'guardians' of absent class members, scholars have proposed
various mechanisms by which district judges may fulfill their duties to scrutinize (and cut) the lawyers'
fee requests.").
15. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(e); see also David R. Clay, Federal Attraction for the Interstate Class Ac-
tion: The Effect of Devlin v. Scardelletti and the Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)
on Class Action "Minimal Diversity" Concerns, 52 EMORY L.J. 1877, 1880 (2003).
16. Coffee, supra note 8, at 438 ("Although many reforms are possible and could succeed, only
one is sure to fail: reliance on trial court scrutiny of the settlement."); Issacharoff, supra note 12, at
829 ("No matter how virtuous the judge, the fact remains that courts are overworked, they have lim-
ited access to quality information, and they have an overwhelming incentive to clear their docket.
They cannot reliably police the day-to-day interests of absent class members.").
No. 4]
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usually complicated and lengthy-just the type of suit that judges prefer
to avoid. 7 For this reason, there is little hope that judicial oversight will
cure the problem. 8
There is, however, a way to end collusion in class settlements. Un-
der the current system, a settlement includes every class member except
those who opt out; all who remain silent are in. 9 This approach differs
from the way we treat other settlements and contracts, which bind only
those who expressly consent.2' Such express consent is required in the
nonclass context so that people will not unwittingly become bound by an
agreement they would not have chosen-the very fate that now befalls
class members.2' Class members should therefore be protected in the
same manner as everyone else: by including in a class settlement only
the people who expressly consent to its terms by opting in.
The consequences of this proposed change would be substantial.
Because few people reply to the letter that notifies them of a class set-
tlement, the opt-in rule would drastically reduce the number of class
members in any settlement.22 As a result, settling a class action would no
longer appeal to either a plaintiffs' lawyer or a defendant. The plaintiffs'
lawyer, who receives a percentage of the total sum paid to the class
members, would get a piece of a very small pie. The defendant, which
seeks to preclude all class members from suing in the future,23 would be
able to bind only those few who opt in.
17. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 389 ("[O]nce a potential settlement of complex litigation is in
view, federal trial courts tend to tolerate almost any conflict in order to achieve a settlement that
brings litigation peace-but at a cost paid by the class members.").
18. Id. at 438; see Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829.
19. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class Actions, 1999
Sup. Cr. REv. 337, 370 (1999).
20. See Whittier Union High Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct., 66 Cal. App. 3d 504, 508 (1977) ("The rule
is almost universal that... [w]ithout his client's free and intelligent consent, after full knowledge of all
the facts and circumstances, an attorney may not surrender any substantial right of his client; nor may
he impair, compromise, or destroy his client's cause of action."); Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudica-
tion: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561, 575 (1993) ("Set-
tlement always requires consent. Parties bargain when they settle, and all must agree to the ultimate
resolution."); see also Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A settlement is a con-
tract, and once entered into is binding and conclusive."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black
Box, 75 B.U. L. REv. 1257, 1266 (1995) ("A settlement is a contract negotiated under unusually con-
strained conditions.").
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTS § 17(1) (1981); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling
Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REv. 461,501-04 (2000).
22. Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARiz. L. REv. 923, 936 (1998)
("Inertia, the complexity of class notices, and the widespread fear of any entanglement with legal pro-
ceedings will lead many reluctant class members to forgo the opportunity to opt out, and likewise will
deter many willing class members from seizing the opportunity to opt in."); see also Eisenberg &
Miller, supra note 7, at 38 ("The overwhelming inaction displayed by class members in the reported
cases suggests that a class member's failure to opt-out should not readily be equated to an affirmative
consent to jurisdiction. Common sense indicates that apathy, not decision, is the basis for inaction."
(emphasis added)).
23. See Nagareda, supra note 5, at 163 ("Defendants want any class settlement to mark the
achievement of an enduring peace in the litigation, not just a flimsy peace in our time.").
[Vol. 2005
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To get what they want, the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant
would need to litigate the case fully and receive an adjudication on the
merits by a judge or a jury. Such an adjudication would bind all class
members, not merely the ones who opt in. If the plaintiffs were to win,
then their lawyer would receive a percentage of the award given to the
entire class-a piece of a very large pie. Win or lose, the defendant
would never again face litigation of the issue from any class member, be-
cause all would be bound by the judgment.
An opt-in system would not unduly discourage plaintiffs from bring-
ing class actions; it would discourage them only from settling class ac-
tions. A class action with valid claims could still go to adjudication,
where the defendant would be held accountable and the class members
and their lawyer would reap the rewards they are due. The enormous
payout of favorable judgments would make it worthwhile for wealthy
plaintiffs' law firms to bear the costs of investigating and litigating the
class actions that offer a chance of victory.
But unlike the current system,24 an opt-in system would discourage
plaintiffs from bringing frivolous class actions. A lawyer who can make
money only by winning at trial, not by settling before trial, will pursue
only the cases that give her a viable chance to win.
Because adjudication costs more than settlement, this proposed opt-
in system would increase the expense (to courts and parties) of meritori-
ous class actions. However, the social benefits derived from ending col-
lusion, and the costs saved by deterring frivolous lawsuits, are likely to
outweigh the cost of funneling the remaining class actions away from set-
tlement and into adjudication.'
Since the inception of class litigation, our system has operated un-
der the unstated and undiscussed assumption that the binding force of a
class action settlement on absent class members must parallel that of a
class action adjudication. Questioning this assumption offers fresh pros-
pects for combating the problem of collusion in class settlements.
I. CLASS ADJUDICATIONS: A GOOD OPT-OUT RULE
The adjudication of a class action binds every class member except
the few who opt out. This rule is necessary to sustain class actions and
thereby to safeguard the important social benefits yielded by those law-
suits.
24. Project, Developments in the Law-The Paths of Civil Litigation, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1752,
1812 (2000) [hereinafter Developments] ("Unfortunately the pressure to settle exists even with respect
to frivolous filings, which are an ongoing concern in the class action context, and are as costly to liti-
gate as legitimate claims. The pressure on defendants to settle even non-meritorious claims gives
plaintiffs substantial leverage-so much so that some courts and commentators characterize it as
'blackmail."').
25. See infra Part III.
No. 4]
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When a corporation or an individual breaks the law in a way that
harms many people, one of those people may bring suit on behalf of the
others.26 The rule that authorizes such lawsuits, Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, divides class actions into three categories.27
The first category-23(b)(1)-covers cases where separate individual
lawsuits might lead to unfair results for either the class members or the
party opposing the class. 2' The second category-23(b)(2)-involves
lawsuits for injunctions rather than damages. 29  The third category-
23(b)(3)-is a catchall that covers all other class actions.a
In a class action brought under either (b)(1) or (b)(2), the court
need not require the parties to notify the absent class members of the
lawsuit at all. l Even if the class members learn of the action, they have
no right to exclude themselves from it.3 2 When a court authorizes a class
action under (b)(3), it must order the named plaintiff3 to send a letter to
"all class members who can be identified with reasonable effort," to no-
tify them of the lawsuit.' Anyone who wants to be excluded from the
lawsuit should tell the court at that time, although the court might grant
another opportunity for exclusion later in the litigation.a5
Aside from those who opt out of (b)(3) lawsuits, all class members
are bound by the outcome of any class action, even if they never knew of
the case. This rule is double-edged. It cuts against the usual emphasis on
giving every person her day in court and, in doing so, it threatens perhaps
the most central tenet of the civil justice system -that a court will not de-
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representa-
tive parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.").
27. For a critical discussion of these categories, see John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Ac-
tion Rule, 78 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1419, 1423-34 (2003).
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) ("An action may be maintained as a class action if ... the prosecu-
tion of separate actions... would create a risk of (A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with re-
spect to individual members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for
the party opposing the class, or (B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.").
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ("An action may be maintained as a class action if... the party oppos-
ing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making
appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole.").
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) ("An action may be maintained as a class action if... the court finds
that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.").
31. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
32. See FED. R. Cyv. P. 23(c)(2)(A)-(B).
33. Although Rule 23 permits the notice letters to be assigned to anyone, they are almost always
assigned to the named plaintiff. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 179 (1974) ("[T]he
plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit.").
34. Id. at 174.
35. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(A), (e)(3).
[Vol. 2005
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cide a person's dispute without giving her a chance to tell her side of the
story.
36
But there is a very good reason to take this approach, even in the
face of such an important countervailing value. The current default
rule-i.e., a class member is a party to the lawsuit unless she opts out-
allows the class action to serve its central purpose of remedying and de-
terring dispersed harm.37 If a class action adjudication bound only the
people who opted in by replying to the notice letter, then class litigation
would disappear. Because people simply do not reply to notice letters,
38
a lawsuit that includes only the few who reply would be too small to at-
tract a lawyer for the group.
Eliminating the incentive to bring class actions would create a social
cost that is too high to bear. If, for example, a corporation commits a
tort that cheats one million people each out of ten dollars, then only a
class action enables the victims to seek recompense and forces the
wrongdoer to relinquish its ill-gotten profit.39 No individual can sue, be-
cause the cost of hiring a lawyer exceeds the damages owed.' The class
action thus opens an avenue to pursue compensation and deterrence that
would otherwise be closed.4" When the main importance of a tort is its
aggregate effect, it makes sense for a lawsuit to treat the offense accord-
ingly-for the victimized parties to bring their action as a group.42
It is therefore essential to retain the current opt-out system for class
adjudications.
36. See STEVEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 2,8 (1987).
37. See Lahav, supra note 11, at 70.
38. Cooper, supra note 22, at 936; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 40; Benjamin Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I),
81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 397-98 (1967) ("[Rlequiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in
the lawsuit would result in freezing out the claims of people-especially small claims held by small
people-who for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal mat-
ters, will simply not take the affirmative step.").
39. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1380 ("The potential virtue of a class action is that it
prevents the defendant from using the plaintiffs' numerosity against them. Once the plaintiffs' claims
are aggregated and the task of representing them assigned to a single group of attorneys, the plaintiffs
can exploit the same scale economies as the defendant when investing in the case.").
40. See Lahav, supra note 11, at 70 ("Among other things, class actions solve the collective action
problems faced by individuals with claims too small to be economically adjudicated individually, and
address certain small private wrongs with substantial public effects, especially in the absence of gov-
ernmental intervention."); Developments in the Law- Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458,
1467 (1986) ("Because each victim's share of the aggregate harm is small relative to the costs of litiga-
tion, no single victim finds pursuit of either damages or injunctive relief a worthwhile investment.").
41. See Lahav, supra note 11, at 70.
42. See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 12, at 1380 n.10 ("The policy at the very core of the class
action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for
any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by
aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an at-
torney's) labor.").
No. 4]
HeinOnline  -- 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 909 2005
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
II. CLASS SETTLEMENTS: A BROKEN SYSTEM
Few class actions actually go to adjudication; nearly all of them set-
tle. Unlike adjudication, settlement enables plaintiffs' lawyers and de-
fendants to craft the outcome of a case. How they craft that outcome is
influenced heavily by the current opt-out rule, which lets them enrich
themselves at the expense of the class members. The current rule relies
upon judges and absent class members to thwart such collusion, but those
people have strong incentives to abdicate their policing duties. As a re-
sult, collusion undercuts the social value of class litigation.
A. Collusion
Our current approach to class settlements enables plaintiffs' attor-
neys to collude with defendants in crafting settlements that pay the ab-
sent class members less than the expected value of the litigation. 3 Such
collusion harms society even when each class member's claim is small,
because it prevents the civil justice system from properly deterring de-
fendants from breaking the law for profit.' It is a widespread and intrac-
table problem. 5
When a class action under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) settles, "[t]he
court must direct notice in a reasonable manner to all class members who
would be bound by a proposed settlement."'  But if a class member re-
ceives such a notice and tells the court that she wants no part of the
agreement, the court can deny her opt-out request.47 Class members
have the right to opt out of lawsuits brought under 23(b)(3), but that
right is guaranteed only at the initial stage of the lawsuit. If the case later
settles, then the settlement may bind all those who did not opt out origi-
nally, even though the class members could not have known the terms of
the settlement at the time they were given their chance to opt out. 8 A
court is permitted, but not required, to insist that the parties offer absent
class members a new opportunity to opt out once the terms of the settle-
ment have been crafted.49 Any class members who could not originally
43. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 821 ("In fact, there is no better formula for collusion than a
situation in which the rights of non-participants can be extinguished without notice or an opportunity
to get out from under a prospective court decree.").
44. See Lahav, supra note 11, at 71 ("It may be that the smaller the likely compensation to the
individual, the more important the deterrence justification becomes."); David L. Shapiro, Class Ac-
tions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 913, 923-31 (1998).
45. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 10, at 677 ("Ultimately, the most persuasive account of why class
actions frequently produce unsatisfactory results is the hypothesis that such actions are uniquely vul-
nerable to collusive settlements that benefit plaintiff's attorneys rather than their clients."); Koniak &
Cohen, supra note 12, at 156 ("[Clollusion and inadequate representation are rampant in class ac-
tions .
46. FED. R. Ctv.P. 23(e)(1)(B).
47. E.g., Mollie A. Murphy, The Intersystem Class Settlement: Of Comity, Consent, and Collu-
sion, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 413,452-53 (1999).
48. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(e)(3).
49. Id.
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be identified "through reasonable effort" are bound by the settlement
even if they never were sent any notice of the class action." The same is
true of class members who were sent, but who never received, notice let-
ters.
Class members thus play virtually no role in their own lawsuit." In-
stead, class litigation is driven by the two entities with the most at stake:
the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant. The former pursues a poten-
tially costly and time-consuming lawsuit in the hope that the suit will
yield a vast profit. 2 The latter faces the danger of a huge loss, but also
the prospect of freeing itself from all future risks posed by the claims be-
ing raised. 3 Each player seeks to make as much or lose as little money as
possible, while incurring the lowest risks and transaction costs.
A settlement is ideal for reducing risks and costs. Both sides avoid
the expense of trial, the defendant avoids the danger of a devastating
award of damages by a judge or a jury, and the plaintiffs' lawyer avoids
the danger of wasting considerable time and money on a case that she ul-
timately might lose and for which she would then be paid nothing at all.
Despite these mutual benefits of settlement, it might seem that the plain-
tiffs' lawyer and the defendant remain adversaries because the former
wants the settlement to be large whereas the latter wants it to be small.
The plaintiffs' lawyer's fee is typically a percentage of the money that the
class recovers from the lawsuit. 4 It would appear, therefore, that absent
class members could trust their lawyer to press for as large a settlement
award as possible.
But this is not so, for many reasons. One is that litigating a case
saddles the lawyer, but not the class members, with opportunity costs.
The lawyer could settle many cases in the time it takes to litigate one, so
it is rational for her to settle quickly even if doing so reduces her profit in
50. See Marcus, supra note 9, at 892 ("In the Agent Orange litigation, the Second Circuit found
that preclusion applied to claimants with after-arising claims even though they did not receive notice,
emphasizing the adequacy of representation these claimants received from others.").
51. E.g., Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 5 ("This evidence supports the claim, often found
in the literature, that class counsel controls the litigation.").
52. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 3
(1991) ("Accordingly, plaintiffs' class and derivative attorneys function essentially as entrepreneurs
who bear a substantial amount of the litigation risk and exercise nearly plenary control over all impor-
tant decisions in the lawsuit."); see also Nagareda, supra note 5, at 164 ("For class actions, no less than
for any economic market, monopoly power carries the usual potential for higher prices and lower out-
put. Here, higher prices come in the form of excessive fees for class counsel, and lower output consists
of low-quality representation of the class in the form of an inadequate settlement.").
53. See Nagareda, supra note 5, at 164 ("The monopoly is what enables class counsel to tender
for sale the entirety of claims in the litigation and, hence, the prospect of lasting peace for the defen-
dant.").
54. E.g., Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829. A less common fee arrangement, the "lodestar"
method, is based on the number of hours the lawyer works on the case. This method has fallen into
disfavor because it fails even more strikingly than does the contingent fee to tie the lawyer's fate to
that of the class. As a result, it results in collusion even more than does the contingent fee. For a dis-
cussion of the many drawbacks of the lodestar method, see Charles Silver, Class Actions-
Representative Proceedings, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 194,211-13 (2000).
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the individual case. This calculation redounds to the detriment of class
members, who receive less than the amount that would be their expected
value from a trial or from a negotiation conducted with only their inter-
ests in mind.55
Another factor that causes the interests of plaintiffs' lawyers to di-
verge from those of their clients is the discrepancy between the attor-
ney's fee (which is large) and each class member's recovery (which is far
smaller). Because of the declining marginal value of money,56 accepting
an early settlement to avoid the costs and risks of trial makes far more
sense for the lawyer than it does for the class members." A class mem-
ber with typical risk preferences would prefer a 75% chance of receiving
$100 to a certainty of receiving $25. But a plaintiffs' lawyer with the
same typical risk preferences would prefer a certainty of receiving $5 mil-
lion to a 75% chance of receiving $20 million, because the first $5 million
means far more to most people than does the next $15 million.58 This
problem would be less severe if the lawyer or her firm had assets that
dwarf the settlement fee, because such a firm might be risk-neutral with
respect to $5 million, just as a class member is risk-neutral with respect to
$25. But not all plaintiffs' lawyers have vast resources, or a large and di-
verse pool of class lawsuits to pursue. And for those who are fortunate
enough to have those things, the opportunity costs discussed above loom
particularly large.
In any event, the client rather than the lawyer is most trustworthy in
making the choice to accept a settlement offer;59 but in a class action set-
tlement, the lawyer strikes the deal without getting approval from most
of the clients. The named plaintiffs typically look the other way because,
even when they are not paid off with "bonuses" for their willingness to
represent the class,' their recoveries are often too small to be worth the
trouble; and if they objected, the court might approve the settlement
nonetheless.61
55. Silver, supra note 54, at 213. Of course, the expected value to which I refer incorporates (i.e.,
is discounted in accordance with) the possibility that the plaintiffs will lose at trial, or that they will win
only a small amount. Even with such discounting, class actions are typically worth more to the class
members than the settlement gives them. Id.
56. Id. at 214.
57. Coffee, supra note 8, at 391 ("Across a broad range of cases, plaintiffs' attorneys will be
more risk averse than class members in considering settlement offers and will wish to accept many
offers that the class will rationally wish to reject."); Silver, supra note 54, at 213.
58. See Recent Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2702, 2707 (2003) (noting that in class actions, "contin-
gent fees encourage lawyers to avoid trial expenses by settling early for an amount that does not gen-
erally maximize net claim value").
59. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 811 n.17 ("[Slettlement decisions ultimately reflect an assess-
ment of risk and are subject to individual variations in risk-seeking or risk-aversion-decisions which
should presumptively be left to the affected individuals."); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002).
60. See Clinton A. Krislov, Scrutiny of the Bounty: Incentive Awards For Plaintiffs In Class Liti-
gation, 78 ILL. B.J. 286, 286-87 (1990).
61. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants also harm absent class members
by circumventing the contractual link between the lawyer's fee and the
sum that the class actually receives. Like any other contract, a settlement
can have whatever terms the parties desire.62 Class members can there-
fore receive payment in a form other than cash in return for their agree-
ment to waive their right to pursue present and future litigation. A clas-
sic example of such alternative payment is coupons.63 A settlement might
require the defendant to give each class member a coupon for the reduc-
tion in cost of a product sold by the defendant.' The plaintiffs' lawyer
receives a percentage of the total value, as measured by criteria listed in
the settlement agreement, of all the coupons given to the class. By over-
stating that value, plaintiffs' attorneys can receive a higher fee relative to
the class's recovery than they deserve under the fee arrangement.65 A
plaintiffs' lawyer can thus collude with a defendant to structure a deal
that gives the class members coupons worth far less than the class's ex-
pected recovery, but that values the coupons at more than the expected
62. Of course, it must not violate public policy or be void on any other contractual ground. But
the law of contracts makes clear that voiding a contract over the objections of both parties is excep-
tional. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio S.W.R. Co. v. Voight, 176 U.S. 498, 505 (1900) ("[Tlhe right of pri-
vate contract is no small part of the liberty of the citizen, and.., the usual and most important func-
tion of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts, than to enable parties thereto to
escape from their obligation on the pretext of public policy, unless it clearly appear that they contra-
vene public right or the public welfare."); Gates Corp. v. Bando Chem. Indus., 4 F. App'x 676, 686
(10th Cir. 2001) ("Parties to a contract... may agree on whatever terms they see fit so long as such
terms do not violate statutory prohibitions or public policy." (internal quotation marks omitted));
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Price, 714 N.E.2d 712, 716 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) ("[A]s a general rule, the
law allows competent adults the utmost liberty in entering into contracts .... Nevertheless, despite the
very strong presumption of enforceability, courts have refused to enforce private agreements that con-
travene statute, clearly tend to injure the public in some way, or are otherwise contrary to the declared
public policy .... ); 15 GRACE McLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRAcrs § 79.4 (Joseph M. Perillo
ed., rev. ed. 2003) ("[Clourts of today seem reticent to refuse to enforce contracts unless the public
policy of the jurisdiction is fairly clear."); Steven W. Feldman & James A. DeLanis, Resolving Con-
tractual Ambiguity in Tennessee: A Systematic Approach, 68 TENN. L. REv. 73, 76 n.9 (2000) ("The
cases partially address such objections, upholding contracts in doubtful cases and requiring a well-
defined, dominant public policy, where public detriment will probably result before the contract is
deemed void."); cf. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross Inc., 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994) ("In-
deed, short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a panel of three monkeys,
parties can stipulate to whatever procedures they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes; par-
ties are as free to specify idiosyncratic terms of arbitration as they are to specify any other terms in
their contract.").
63. Geoffrey Miller & Lori Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 97, 102 (1997).
64. See Christopher R. Leslie, A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and
Consumer Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REv. 991, 995 ("Coupons have also provided the es-
sential currency to settle a vast variety of consumer class actions.").
65. See infra note 92 and accompanying text. Stopping attorneys from overstating the value of
coupons is more difficult than it might seem. See infra text accompanying notes 92-101.
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recovery.' The result would be a windfall to the defendant and to the
plaintiffs' lawyer, at the expense of absent class members.67
Another form of collusion in class settlements is "reversion." This
occurs when the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant craft a settlement
that calls for the defendant to place money in a fund for class members.
Each class member may claim the small amount to which she is entitled,
but all unclaimed funds revert to the defendant. The plaintiffs' lawyer
receives a percentage of the overall amount paid into the fund, but both
that lawyer and the defendant know the class will ultimately receive far
less than this overall amount because "claim rates in class actions tend to
be low."'  Thus the defendant pays less than it should,69 the plaintiffs'
lawyer makes more than he should,7" and the class members lose out (as
do victims of the future misconduct that goes underdeterred).71
All of these problems are aggravated by a powerful trump card of-
ten held by a class action defendant. If the lawyer for a plaintiff class re-
fuses to settle a case on terms favorable to the defendant, then the de-
fendant can seek out another lawyer and encourage him to bring a
separate but identical class action and settle it on the proposed terms.72
Because "the first class action to settle moots all other similar class ac-
tions and... only the attorney handling the settled case is likely to earn a
fee,"73 such a deal would give a windfall to the new lawyer and the de-
fendant while leaving the original lawyer empty-handed. To avoid this
fate, plaintiffs' lawyers face pressure to settle on terms that favor the de-
fendant-and themselves-but not the absent class members or the civil
justice system.74
66. See Leslie, supra note 64, at 996 ("Although the class counsel is supposed to represent the
class's interests and be compensated based on how well it does so, coupon settlements decouple the
interests of the class and its counsel.").
67. Id. at 995 ("While this represents a win-win scenario for the class counsel and the defendant,
many class members are left uncompensated.").
68. Silver, supra note 54, at 214.
69. That is, it pays less than it would have expected to pay if it had either gone to adjudication or
engaged in fair, fully adversarial settlement negotiations.
70. That is, he receives a higher percentage of the class's actual recovery than he would have
received if the class members had ended up with the full sum of money upon which the lawyer's con-
tingent fee was calculated.
71. See Silver, supra note 54, at 213-14.
72. Coffee, supra note 8, at 393 ("[Riational plaintiffs' attorneys will need to consider.., the
prospect that a competitor may emerge, thereby inclining them to accept a cheaper settlement."); Sil-
ver, supra note 54, at 214-15; see also John C. Coffee, Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1365 (1995).
73. Silver, supra note 54, at 214.
74. Id. at 214-15; see also Coffee, supra note 72, at 1371-72.
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B. Policing Collusion Within the Opt-Out System
Rule 23 seems to protect absent class members against collusion by
requiring that any settlement be approved by the court.75 Indeed, a prin-
cipal aim of the 2003 amendments to the rule was to strengthen judicial
oversight of class settlements.76 These amendments respond to the calls
of many commentators for such scrutiny as a means of curing the prob-
lem of collusion.77
But judicial oversight faces substantial obstacles. First, it is not at
all clear that judges want to stop collusive settlements.7" Whenever a
judge rejects such a deal, she risks forcing the parties to litigate the case
fully, thereby increasing her own workload. A federal district court
judge recently explained that he opposes reforms aimed at thwarting col-
lusive coupon settlements because "[f]rom the court's perspective, it
would be terrible if a case went to trial because a settlement option is not
available. '79  Due to the "overwhelming incentive to clear their
docket,"' judges are "subjected to strong institutional pressures to move
cases along."'" To say the least, they "lack appropriate incentives"8 to
police the settlements. 3 When courts turn a blind eye to "suspicious
signs of collusion[,] ... the fact of judicial self-interest must be placed at
center stage."'
Review by appellate judges also offers little hope. Faced with
crowded dockets of their own, they are sensitive to the workload con-
cerns of the trial court judges, who are often their friends. Moreover,
they are even less capable than are trial judges of investigating the fair-
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A) ("The court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, or
compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.").
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) advisory committee's note ("Subdivision (e) is amended to strengthen
the process of reviewing proposed class-action settlements. Settlement may be a desirable means of
resolving a class action. But court review and approval are essential to assure adequate representation
of class members who have not participated in shaping the settlement.").
77. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 9, at 907; Judith Resnik, Litigating and Settling Class Actions:
The Prerequisites of Entry and Exit, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 835, 858 (1997); Georgene M. Vairo, The
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, and the Rhetoric of Mass Tort Claims Resolution, 31 LoY. L.A. L. REV.
79, 161-62 (1997); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the Unrepresented in Class Ac-
tions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 439, 477-501 (1996).
78. Coffee, Class Wars, supra note 72, at 1462; Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829; Silver, supra
note 54, at 216.
79. Class Action Lawyers Doubt Provisions in Legislation Aimed at Curbing Abuses, 72
U.S.L.W. (BNA) 2593 (Apr. 6, 2004) (quoting Judge Frederick Motz of the District of Maryland),
available at http://pubs.bna.com/ip/BNA/law2.nsf/is/aOa8h2k7f7.
80. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829; see also James A. Henderson, Jr., Settlement Class Actions
and the Limits of Adjudication, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1014, 1021 (1995) ("The court has a direct and
personal benefit to be gained by approving the settlement ....").
81. Silver, supra note 54, at 216; see also Coffee, supra note 72, at 1462 ("[T]he performance of
courts in handling mass tort class actions appears to have varied in direct proportion to the amount of
docket pressure under which the trial court has perceived itself to be.").
82. Silver, supra note 54, at 216.
83. Possibly adding to the problem is the fact that, according to many, judges are "overworked."
Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829; see also Silver, supra note 54, at 216.
84. Coffee, supra note 72, at 1462-63.
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ness of a settlement in the absence of meaningful adversarial proceed-
ings. They are therefore loath to reject a settlement approved by a lower
court: "Our appellate review of the district court's approval of a settle-
ment is limited; an approved settlement will not be upset unless the court
clearly abused its discretion.... [O]ur limited review rule is a product of
the strong judicial policy favoring the resolution of disputes through set-
tlement."'
Second, even the most willing judge might well be unable to deter-
mine that a settlement is unfair to absent class members. The "job of po-
licing substantively defective settlements" is "almost impossible"'  be-
cause a court cannot gauge what sort of deal would have been struck
under truly adversarial conditions. There is no "market" for class set-
tlements,87 and the most comparable cases are usually other class actions
that were settled collusively.' Moreover, every settlement is simply a
contract and as such depends upon the risk preferences of the parties.89
It is impossible to know-with the level of confidence a court would want
to have-that most class members would prefer to risk rejecting an early
settlement offer, even though their lawyer would prefer to accept it, due
to the opportunity cost of litigation or to money's declining marginal
value. There is thus a "lack of objective fairness criteria in class action
settlements."'
Even the most egregious tactics can be difficult to stop. In coupon
settlements, plaintiffs' lawyers hire experts to assess the value of the cou-
pons, and those experts typically base their assessments on "wildly opti-
mistic" assumptions about the number of class members likely to use the
coupons.91 How can judges establish that the assessments are unreason-
able? Judges have "limited fact-gathering capabilities"' and "limited ac-
cess to quality information."93 They "have to rely on others for most of
their information. Yet their usual sources-class counsel and defen-
85. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Mendoza v. United States,
623 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981) ("Broad discretion is granted to
the trial judge, enabling him or her to respond fluidly to the varying needs of particular cases. There-
fore, although certain factors must be considered and certain procedures complied with, much of the
judicial oversight of class actions is in the form of the sound discretion of the District Court.").
86. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 830.
87. Hazard, supra note 20, at 1266 ("Moreover, there is no shared reference point as to the value
of the claim, such as 'reasonable market price.' Litigation claims have no market in the understood
sense of that term.").
88. Silver, supra note 54, at 216.
89. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 811 n.17.
90. Id. at 830 n.79 (citing Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Settlement Black Box, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1257, 1266-68 (1995)).
91. Silver, supra note 54, at 213; accord Severin Borenstein, Settling for Coupons: Discount Con-
tracts as Compensation and Punishment in Antitrust Lawsuits, 39 J.L. & ECON. 379, 380-81 (1996).
92. Silver, supra note 54, at 216.
93. Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829.
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dants-cannot be relied upon to pinpoint evidence that would scuttle a
deal.
9 4
Filling this adversarial void has proven most difficult. Even if some
individual members of the class-be they named plaintiffs or absent class
members-know of the deal and realize that it is unfair, they are unlikely
to stop the settlement." In most class actions, the cost of hiring experts96
or of otherwise mounting an effective case exceeds a class member's ex-
pected recovery.97 And even a truly vigilant class member might be
"bought off" by the defendant and the plaintiffs' lawyer, who can make
the disgruntled individual a named plaintiff and accordingly give him the
bonus98 those plaintiffs may receive.99 Under these circumstances, it is no
wonder that "[j]udges approve settlements in ninety percent of the cases
where objections are filed."1"
This is not to say that meaningful reforms are impossible within the
opt-out system. Prohibiting reversion and coupon settlements would be
a step in the right direction. Another good step might be to replace the
rule that "the first class action to settle moots all other similar class ac-
tions" with a rule privileging the first class action to be filed. These sorts
of reforms would improve upon the status quo, but they would still fall
far short of the goal of ending collusion. Due to opportunity costs and
risk aversion, even with these reforms lawyers would continue to settle
cases for less than they would if their interests were aligned with those of
their clients.
The law and economics literature has made a collection of reform
proposals of a different sort, many of which involve using an auction to
sell either the entire lawsuit or the mere right to be the attorney who liti-
gates it. Rather than give a survey of that literature here, I refer readers
to the very useful account of it in a recent article by Alon Harel and Alex
Stein in the Yale Law & Policy Review."1 Harel and Stein explain the
problems with each proposal. One important theme running through
those problems is that, due to the severe danger of overbidding, the pro-
posed auctions would attract too few buyers who would each bid far
lower than the actual value of the lawsuit.1" Such a result would create
94. Silver, supra note 54, at 216; see also Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 808 ("Perhaps in no other
context do we find courts entering binding decrees with such a complete lack of access to quality in-
formation and so completely dependent on the parties who have the most to gain from favorable court
action."); Leslie, supra note 64, at 996-97 ("[B]ecause actual coupon value is difficult for courts to cal-
culate, coupon settlements afford class counsel an opportunity to convince a reviewing judge that the
settlement is more valuable than it actually is, and thereby increase the attorneys' fees awarded.").
95. See Silver, supra note 54, at 215-16.
96. See, e.g., David Medine, The Constitutional Right to Expert Assistance for Indigents in Civil
Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 281,291 (1990).
97. Silver, supra note 54, at 216.
98. See Krislov, supra note 60, at 286-87.
99. Silver, supra note 54, at 215-16.
100. Id. at 217; see also Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 34.
101. Harel & Stein, supra note 11, at 90-107.
102. Id. at 91-92.
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the same problems of underdeterrence and undercompensation as the
current system.'03
III. AN OPT-IN RULE FOR CLASS SETTLEMENTS
If we adopted an opt-in rule for class settlements while retaining the
opt-out rule for class adjudications, then we would end collusion without
compromising the valuable social functions of the class action. This
change would funnel class lawsuits away from settlement and into adju-
dication, where collusion would be more difficult to sustain. The result-
ing increase in the workload of a few judges is an acceptable price for de-
terring companies from inflicting dispersed harm and for fairly
compensating the victims of such harm.
A. Removing the Incentives That Lead to Collusion
What would happen if we switched to a system in which a class set-
tlement included only those who replied to notice letters and expressed
their assent to the terms of the deal? In such an opt-in system, all class
members who do not opt in would receive nothing but would retain their
right to file their own lawsuits.
It is likely that only a small percentage of class members would take
the trouble to opt in. t" As a result, the settlement would give neither the
plaintiffs' lawyer nor the defendant what it wants. °5 The plaintiffs' law-
yer receives a percentage of the total sum given to the class members; if
that sum included only the payouts to the few who opted in, then the
lawyer's take would be very small. The defendant, who seeks to use the
class action to free itself, once and for all, of liability to the class mem-
bers,"° would be able to preclude only a few people from suing in the fu-
ture. A settlement would thus offer no big payout to the lawyer and no
peace for the defendant. These deals, currently so attractive to both of
the powerful players in class litigation, would become undesirable to
those players.
Some might suggest that this change would produce better notice to
class members. If both the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant could get
what they wanted only through bringing large numbers of people into the
class, and if that in turn could be accomplished only by convincing many
103. Unfortunately, Harel and Stein's own auction solution fails to escape this problem.
104. E.g., HENSLER ET AL., supra note 14, at 15 & n.22; Cooper, supra note 22, at 936 ("Inertia,
the complexity of class notices, and the widespread fear of any entanglement with legal proceed-
ings.., will deter many willing class members from seizing the opportunity to opt in."). Those who
opt in would be freely choosing to enter the deal, unlike class members who do not reply to notice let-
ters in the opt-out system.
105. See Samuel Issacharoff, supra note 19, at 370 ("[Any requirement that the consent of all the
governed is the prerequisite to judicial approval of the maintenance or settlement of a class action
threatens the viability of this aggregative tool.").
106. Id. at 345.
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people to opt in, then notice letters might become very persuasive and
easy to understand. Such an outcome would be welcome. Many have
criticized notice letters for being difficult to understand, so as to discour-
age class members from responding." 7 Making a response desirable to
the senders would create an incentive for the letters to be user-friendly.
It is more likely, however, that the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defen-
dant would take a different approach. They would realize that even the
most effective notice letters are unlikely to persuade most class members
to opt in. Moreover, persuading many to opt in would still be insufficient
for a defendant to get what it wants-litigation peace. As long as a large
number of class members remain outside the settlement, there will al-
ways be the danger of future litigation that could result in a substantial
judgment. As a result, the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant would
need to pursue their goals through a different channel.
That channel is adjudication. The opt-in regime would apply only
to settlement; an adjudicated class action would still include every class
member except those who opt out."° Plaintiffs' lawyers and defendants
could therefore use class adjudication to achieve the ends they currently
achieve via class settlement. If the plaintiff class wins at trial, then its
lawyer will reap a huge reward. Regardless of the outcome of the trial,
the defendant will be free of all future litigation from any class member.
Because judgments, unlike settlements, are crafted by the court
rather than by the parties and their lawyers, an opt-in system would
greatly reduce the opportunity to collude. It would thus solve the main
problem that currently plagues class actions.
B. Is the Cure Worse Than the Disease?
Even if an opt-in system would end collusion, would it create more
problems than it solves? The most troubling possibility is that it would
discourage plaintiffs' attorneys from filing class lawsuits by making the
reward for such cases more difficult, time-consuming, costly, and uncer-
tain to obtain."t° Lawyers will be less inclined to invest in class actions if
their return on the investment depends on securing a favorable verdict
rather than merely a lucrative settlement. This phenomenon might cause
particularly severe harm in cases where each class member's claim is
small and therefore could not be brought individually-the cases for
which the class action is most needed.
107. E.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident
Classmembers, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1148, 1185 (1998) ("Class notices are complex, all too often unin-
formative, and misleading. They are designed to encourage inaction; and they are frequently 'incom-
prehensible to average citizens."' (citation omitted)).
108. Of course, in some class actions no one may opt out. Only members of a class certified under
Rule 23(b)(3), not under 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), may opt out. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(c)(3).
109. See generally Halfteck, supra note 1.
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This concern is real and important. Yet the extent to which it is
troubling depends in part on one's view of the investment incentives cre-
ated by the current system. Many defendants and commentators argue
that plaintiffs routinely file frivolous class actions because they know that
defending the lawsuit costs more, and is riskier, than settling it."t0 Ac-
cording to some, the vast majority of class actions fall into this cate-
gory."' If these critics are right, then a system that reduces incentives to
file class lawsuits might be better, not worse, than the status quo.
Indeed, an opt-in system would operate mainly to discourage the
least meritorious class actions. Where settlement is undesirable for all, a
plaintiffs' lawyer will be able to profit only by receiving a favorable ver-
dict. Such an outcome is unlikely if the lawsuit is frivolous, so plaintiffs'
lawyers can be expected to avoid the expense of litigating such suits.
What about meritorious class actions? Ideally, the procedure gov-
erning class actions should be structured to align the private interest in
pursuing such actions with the public benefit the lawsuits create."2 Be-
cause many elements affect a lawyer's decision to invest in a class action,
much empirical and conceptual work remains to be done in moving to-
ward that alignment" 3 At present, it is impossible to know the extent to
which an opt-in rule would deter lawyers from filing meritorious class
lawsuits. But if I were to venture a guess, I would weigh heavily the con-
sideration that in meritorious cases, victory at adjudication brings such
exorbitant payouts to the lawyer that she will have an incentive to pursue
the lawsuit despite the substantial cost and uncertainty of trial. This
holds most strongly for large plaintiffs' firms that have the resources to
litigate many class actions in an attempt to win one. It seems likely that
when the class members' claims are valid, the probability of success at
adjudication will often be high enough-when combined with the enor-
mous rewards of winning-to motivate a plaintiffs' attorney. In any
event, the collusive settlements that characterize the status quo offer so
little compensation and deterrence that they likely generate less social
welfare than a system in which fewer meritorious lawsuits are filed but all
of them go to adjudication.
110. E.g., Developments, supra note 24, at 1812 ("Unfortunately the pressure to settle exists even
with respect to frivolous filings, which are an ongoing concern in the class action context, and are as
costly to litigate as legitimate claims. The pressure on defendants to settle even non-meritorious
claims gives plaintiffs substantial leverage-so much so that some courts and commentators character-
ize it as 'blackmail."'); Randy Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Prob-
lem: Mandatory Summary Judgment (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 90, 2004), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=485242; see also, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th
Cir. 1995) (noting that defendants' only choices are "to stake their companies on the outcome of a
single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liabil-
ity"); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120 (1973); Milton Handler,
The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Law, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971).
111. See, e.g., Eric D. Green, What Will We Do When Adjudication Ends? We'll Settle in Bunches:
Bringing Rule 23 into the Twenty-First Century, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1773, 1775 (1997).
112. E.g., Halfteck, supra note 1, at 11 & n.17.
113. Id. at 55-58.
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It is true that class actions that cannot be tried (e.g., because they
are unmanageable) would no longer be able to settle, unless an effective
opt-in mechanism could be created. This is no great cause for concern.
An unmanageable class should be broken into smaller parts-perhaps by
dividing the full set of plaintiffs into subgroups, each of which includes
only similarly situated members -and litigated accordingly.
Another concern is that the opt-in system will clog the courts by re-
placing settlements with trials. Despite the expected decrease in frivo-
lous litigation, it is true that an opt-in rule would likely place an added
burden on the courts. Although it is not clear how best to measure em-
pirically the benefits of ending collusion, in order to compare those bene-
fits with the cost of trials, the benefits here seem likely to far outweigh
the costs. Even if every class action that is currently settled would in-
stead be litigated (a clearly false premise), the overall effect on the court
system would be relatively minor because class actions comprise so tiny a
fraction of all cases.' 14 It is true, of course, that a class action might con-
sume far more resources than an ordinary individual case. But by certi-
fying a class, a court has already saved the system and the parties enor-
mous resources by using a single trial to resolve thousands or millions of
disputes. Preventing further resources from being saved via settlement
is, by comparison, a drop in the bucket. Ending collusion, on the other
hand, is an important step toward deterring corporations from enriching
themselves via the infliction of dispersed harm.
It is reasonable to fear that judges would respond to the opt-in rule
by finding new ways to avoid trial. They might deny more requests for
class certification, or they might grant more motions to dismiss or mo-
tions for summary judgment in class actions. These negative by-products
of the opt-in system are likely to occur, at least at the margins, but they
are very unlikely to be either as harmful or as prevalent as judicial ap-
proval of collusive settlements. First, it is easier for a judge to abdicate
responsibility when her duty is merely to supervise a deal than when it is
to render a judgment. In reviewing a settlement, the judge is asked only
to demand that it be adequate, not that it be the right legal outcome.115
Accustomed to shouldering the responsibility for the outcome of a
case-and accustomed to being equipped with a meaningful adversary
process to help render that outcome -a judge might understandably con-
ceive her role in settlement review as vanishingly limited. It is ultimately
the parties and their agents who are responsible for a bad deal, whereas
114. Compare Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1219, 1236 (1992) ("Take, for example, the number of class actions filed per year in the federal
courts. In 1976, that number stood at 3584. A decade later it was only 736, and it has stayed consis-
tently under 1000 since that time."), with Gary D. Williams, Weighing the Costs and Benefits of Mediat-
ing Estate Planning Issues Before Disputes Between Family Members Arise: The Scale Tips in Favor of
Mediation, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 819 n.3 (2001) ("Today, we ... file more lawsuits (15 mil-
lion per year), than any other country in the world.").
115. See infra Part IV.
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the judge is principally to blame for a wrongful denial of class certifica-
tion or a wrongful grant of a motion to dismiss. Second, judges always
have the power to act in their own interests by granting motions to dis-
miss or motions for summary judgment, but there is less evidence of
abuse of such power than there is in the context of settlement review.116
Although more attention should probably be paid to judicial self-interest
in other contexts, the outcry against approved collusive settlements sug-
gests that those settlements represent a larger and more pressing prob-
lem.
A final worry is that in an opt-in system, collusive trials would re-
place collusive settlements: the plaintiffs' lawyer and the defendant
could secretly agree to manipulate the verdict by pulling their punches at
trial. Indeed, a judge's role in a trial is less active and inquisitorial, at
least in theory, than in a settlement review hearing. Nevertheless, collud-
ing at trial is far riskier and more difficult to execute than is colluding in
a settlement. In a recent article, Randy Kozel and David Rosenberg ar-
gue for discouraging frivolous class lawsuits by denying judicial enforce-
ability to any class settlement before the summary judgment stage. 7
They explain that litigants could not circumvent their proposal by agree-
ing in advance to "throw" the summary judgment motion and then settle
collusively.' Because that sort of illegal deal is of course unenforceable,
there would be too great a risk that one party would defect; and this risk
would deter the parties from entering into such an arrangement in the
first place."9 The same concerns would stop litigants from staging sham
trials if an opt-in system were adopted. The parties' uncertainty would
be magnified by knowing that the outcome of a trial, unlike that of a set-
tlement, is ultimately controlled by the court rather than by the collud-
ers. And, whereas a court might approve an unfair settlement to clear
the case off its docket,' it has nothing to gain from accepting unfairness
in the judgment. We could therefore expect collusion to diminish sub-
stantially, if not entirely, in an opt-in system."21
116. See Issacharoff, supra note 12, at 829 & n.75.
117. Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 111. Kozel and Rosenberg's proposal does not address the
problem of collusion-just the problem of frivolous lawsuits.
118. Id. at 14-19.
119. Id.
120. See supra Part I.B.
121. Yet another objection that could be raised against the opt-in rule is the claim that I draw too
sharp a distinction between adjudication and settlement. Those two forms of dispute resolution could
be viewed as endpoints on a spectrum, rather than as the only choices in a binary system.
On this view, it might seem best to compromise between the current system and my proposal. We
could, for example, retain the opt-out system and permit parties to settle, but only after a certain
amount of discovery had been conducted. Such a proposal would reduce a judge's incentive to ap-
prove an unfair deal by forcing her to oversee part of the case before reviewing the deal.
But to reduce an incentive is not to eliminate it. So long as a judge knows that one decision (ap-
proving a settlement) will end the case whereas another decision (rejecting the settlement) will pro-
long the case, we cannot trust the judge to police the deal. Under such circumstances, the discovery
itself would likely be a collusive sham because, unlike at adjudication, the parties retain control of the
case's outcome. When a court is not charged with deciding the merits of a case, and the parties have
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IV. THE NATURE OF SETTLEMENT
Class action collusion results from our failure to treat class settle-
ments as the things they are: contracts. Courts use principles of contract
law to protect parties to ordinary settlements, but our civil justice system
has neglected to extend those principles to class settlements. Until we
cure that neglect, we will continue to incur the social costs it creates.
The federal Constitution establishes courts to resolve "cases" and
"controversies." '122 Every lawsuit thus invokes the power of the govern-
ment to decide which side's argument is better supported by established
law.2 a But courts rarely make such decisions: "Over ninety percent of
all cases (both civil and criminal) are currently settled.' 2 E4
A settlement is simply "[a]n agreement ending a dispute or law-
suit."'" Unlike an adjudication, it is not a product of public decision-
making or an expression of the legal principles that would have been ap-
plied to the merits of the dispute at trial. 6 Instead, its character is
principally that of a private contract in which one party relinquishes its
right to litigate in return for something of value from the other party.127
Therefore, "normal rules of contract construction apply to interpretation
of settlement agreements."'" When an agreement has been reached, it
may be challenged not on the ground that it is wrong or unfair, but only
"where there is a claim of lack of actual consent or a lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.... [A] decree that 'appears by the record to have been
the opportunity and the motivation to collude, the result is easy to predict. Collusion would surely
persist in such a system.
122. U.S. CONST. art. Ill.
123. See Owen M. Fiss, The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1979) ("[T]he function
of courts under the common law was paradigmatically... to give meaning to public values through the
enforcement and creation of public norms, such as those embodied in the criminal law and the rules
regarding property, contracts, and torts. The courts created our law. They were the central lawmak-
ing institutions. The judicial function implied by contemporary constitutional litigation ... is continu-
ous with and maybe even identical to that of the common law. The issues have changed, and so has
the social setting; that has required a change in the form of adjudication, though not its function.").
124. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Set-
tlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485,502 (1985).
125. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1377 (7th ed. 1999).
126. Of course, the parties might be influenced by the likely outcome of a trial-and, in turn, by
the laws affecting that outcome-when they negotiate the terms of the settlement. See Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.J. 950, 966 (1979). But this in no way imbues the settlement with the public character we attribute to
an adjudication. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984).
127. E.g., In re Omni Video, Inc., 60 F.3d 230, 232 (5th Cir. 1995) ("As we have held in federal
diversity suits, a settlement is a contract and is best resolved by reference to state contracts law.");
Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 1989) ("A settlement is a contract, and once entered
into is binding and conclusive."), overruled on other grounds by Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Di-
rect, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994); see also KATHERINE V.w. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 176 (2000) ("[A] settlement is a consensual rather than an im-
posed resolution of a dispute.").
128. Press Mach. Corp. v. Smith R.P.M. Corp., 727 F.2d 781, 789 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Roberts v.
Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 533 (8th Cir. 1979)); accord, e.g., Republic Res. Corp. v. ISI Petroleum, 836
F.2d 462, 465 (10th Cir. 1987) ("We construe a settlement stipulation in the same manner as a contract
to determine how it should be enforced.").
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rendered by consent, is always affirmed, without considering the merits of
the cause.""' 9
We thus treat ordinary settlements as contracts. We do not, how-
ever, currently treat class settlements as contracts. As the Supreme
Court recently stated, "a valid contract requires offer and acceptance of
its terms."'30 Let us assume that the defendant in a class action brought
under Rule 23(b)(3) "offers" the terms of a settlement to absent class
members by arranging, along with the plaintiff and the court, to notify
them of the proposed deal. 3' These notification letters will tell the class
members that they will be included in the deal unless they reply and indi-
cate their desire to be excluded. When class members do not reply, does
their silence constitute acceptance? Under contract law, the answer
would be no:
So fundamental is the tenet that mere silence is not acceptance that,
even as the master of the offer, the offeror is powerless to alter the
rule. The seller cannot turn the buyer's silence into acceptance by
adding to the offer, "If I do not hear from you in a week, I will take
it that you have accepted my offer.' 13 2
Karl Llewellyn took the view that it would be "almost lewd" for our sys-
tem to let one person transform another's silence into acceptance
through the terms of the contract.'33 As expressed in the comments to
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, "The mere receipt of an unsolic-
ited offer does not impair the offeree's freedom of action or inaction or
impose on him any duty to speak." 3"
These statements may well put the point too strongly. Contract law
can accommodate scenarios in which it makes sense to treat silence as
acceptance, either because of past dealings between the parties or be-
cause the context surrounding the transaction makes clear that accep-
tance is intended. But those sorts of reasons are absent when a class
member receives unsolicited mail and throws it out. If that type of si-
lence gave rise to a contract, then merchants could flood the public with
129. United States v. Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660,663 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Swift & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 311, 324 (1928)) (emphasis added).
130. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181,186 (2002).
131. Even this much might be problematic, because it is typically the named plaintiff-not the
defendant-who sends the notice letters. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173
(1974). Because the contractual relationship is between each absent class member and the defendant,
it is strange to conceive of the "offer" being sent by a fellow plaintiff. And because the absent class
members never hired the class's lawyer, that lawyer cannot be deemed their "agent."
132. 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 280-81 (3d ed. 2004); accord J.C.
Durick Ins. v. Andrus, 424 A.2d 249,250 (Vt. 1980).
133. Karl Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 2), 48 YALE L.J. 779,
801 n.35 (1939).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 cmt. a (1981); see also Peter Bowal, Com-
ment, Reluctance to Regulate: The Case of Negative Option Marketing, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 377, 381-82
(1999) ("The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods follows this
common law position: 'A Statement made by or other conduct of the offeree indicating assent to an
offer is an acceptance. Silence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance."').
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letters informing them that, unless they reply, they will be bound by
whatever agreement the letter contains.135 Just as we have insufficient
reason to think that the recipient of a mass mailing desires to accept the
proffered deal, we do not learn from a class member's silence whether
she prefers to be included in the settlement.'36
The law of contracts provides a more hospitable environment for
class settlements than might initially be thought. Excluding silent class
members from these agreements does not leave those people empty-
handed. In an opt-in system, class settlements would likely be replaced
by class adjudication,'37 which can be expected to yield more for deserv-
ing class members than would a collusive settlement. Even if a given
class action were to settle, individuals who are left out could form their
own class and sue accordingly; and this scenario, too, might well be more
promising than the initial settlement.'38 More generally, an appealing
point of contract law is that it trusts, and therefore empowers, the indi-
vidual herself to decide whether she would benefit from a proposed ex-
change.
Unlike an ordinary contract, a class settlement must be approved by
a court. But such approval does not transform the agreement into an ad-
judication: A court will approve a class settlement so long as the settle-
ment is "fair, reasonable, and adequate,"'39 and "[i]n determining the
adequacy and reasonableness of the proposed settlement, the court does
not adjudicate the dispute."'' In adjudication, the court bears full re-
sponsibility for ensuring that the outcome is correct under prevailing
law. 4 ' When a court approves a class settlement, by contrast, it decides
in essence that the deal is "good enough." The Seventh Circuit, for ex-
ample, approved a class settlement on the ground that, "at the time of
the district court's approval of the settlement agreement, the desegrega-
tion plan contained in it did not initiate or authorize any clearly unconsti-
135. See Dennis D. Lamont, Comment, Negative Option Offers in Consumer Service Contracts: A
Principled Reconciliation of Commerce and Consumer Protection, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1315, 1321-22
(1995) ("Congress passed the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, essentially converting any unordered
merchandise delivered to a customer's home into a gift and prohibiting sellers from trying to collect
payment for it.").
136. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 667 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled on other grounds by Matsu-
shita Elec. Indus. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 (1996); Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 7, at 40.
137. See supra Part III.A.
138. See Mark Friedman, Note, Constrained Individualism in Group Litigation: Requiring Class
Members to Make a Good Cause Showing Before Opting Out of a Federal Class Action, 100 YALE L.J.
745,753-54 (1990).
139. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(C).
140. Parker v. Anderson, 667 F.2d 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d
431, 433 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[In] examining a proposed compromise ... the court does not try the case.
The very purpose of the compromise is to avoid the delay and expense of such a trial."); Henderson,
supra note 80, at 1021.
141. See Fiss, supra note 124, at 1085 ("Their job is not to maximize the ends of private parties,
nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative
texts such as the Constitution and statutes; to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them.").
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tutional activities." '142 If the court had been adjudicating the case, it
would have decided whether the Constitution was being violated, not
merely whether it was being clearly violated. It therefore comes as no
surprise that the Supreme Court has emphasized the gap between (a) an
agreement that "might survive a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing" and (b)
"the best possible arrangement for the ... class." '43
A court can be trusted to protect the absent class members at adju-
dication because its information and incentives are far better suited to
that role than they are to the review of settlements. At the point of ad-
judication, the court will have heard considerable evidence and testi-
mony on both sides. And at that point, neither outcome will reduce the
court's workload and therefore receive potential favoritism.
The unifying idea behind these points is that adjudication is rooted
in a different source of legitimation from that of settlement. The law re-
quires people to honor the terms of a contract or settlement mainly be-
cause they consented to those terms.'" An adjudication, by contrast, is
not predicated upon consent.'45 Segregationists made clear that they did
not accept Brown v. Board of Education'46 and its progeny, but their
views did not release them from the duty to abide by those judgments.
Someone who is sued will be bound by an adjudication even if he refuses
ever to come to court and represent himself.'47
Like a contract, a settlement is an instrument of ordinary interac-
tion between individuals. An adjudication, on the other hand, is para-
digmatically public. In order to bind people without their consent, a
judgment relies on the legitimizing force that our constitutional system
gives it.'" Because the Constitution imbues courts with the power to re-
solve cases, and because it further bolsters the legitimacy of courts by en-
suring that judges are appointed by politically accountable officials, we
trust the judicial branch to render decrees that must be honored. Be-
cause a settlement lacks such legitimizing force, it requires consent as a
substitute. Our legal system thus has no clear ground on which to de-
mand adherence to the terms of a settlement, such as a class settlement,
in the absence of consent.'49
142. Armstrong v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 616 F.2d 305,322 (7th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
143. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 852 (1999).
144. E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.16 (3d ed. 2004).
145. See Cooper, supra note 22, at 936.
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 55.
148. See Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985) ("Adjudication is more likely
to do justice than conversation, mediation, arbitration, settlement, rent-a-judge, mini-trials, commu-
nity moots or any other contrivance of ADR, precisely because it vests the power of the state in offi-
cials who act as trustees for the public, who are highly visible, and who are committed to reason.").
149. See Fiss, supra note 127, at 1085 ("Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not
strangers chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in which the public participates.
These officials, like members of the legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been
defined and conferred by pubic law, not by private agreement.").
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V. CONCLUSION
We have lived with collusive class settlements for too long. Judges
simply cannot be forced to police such settlements, and the incentive to
clear the docket makes it unlikely that they will accept the policing role
willingly. Even if they did, they would be hamstrung by the adversarial
void and by the absence of evidence brought to light through discovery.
Treating a class settlement in the same manner as any other settle-
ment-as a simple contract-might well bring an end to class action set-
tlements altogether. Only the few class members who opt in would be
part of the settlement and thereby precluded from filing their own law-
suits. Plaintiffs' lawyers could no longer receive large contingent fees
through settlement, because the settlement amount would be small. De-
fendants could no longer insulate themselves from all future lawsuits by
settling. Adjudication would therefore replace settlement as the typical
resolution of class lawsuits, thereby putting an end to collusive agree-
ments. Although this change would cause courts and parties to incur the
costs of litigation, those costs would be mitigated by the new disincentive
for plaintiffs to bring frivolous lawsuits.
Class actions are perhaps as divisive an issue as there is in civil pro-
cedure. 5 Many see these lawsuits as a tool used by greedy and unscru-
pulous plaintiffs' lawyers to extract money from deep-pocketed corpora-
tions that have done nothing wrong-a tool that imposes costs, in turn,
Indeed, the Supreme Court has cast doubt on the notion that class settlements should have the
power to bind those who do not consent. In Martin v. Wilks, the Court addressed a case in which the
NAACP had previously brought a class action against the city government of Birmingham, Alabama,
for racial discrimination in public hiring practices. 490 U.S. 755, 759 (1989). That case had settled, and
in the settlement the city had agreed to pursue certain benchmarks for the hiring and promotion of
black firefighters. Id. When the city implemented this plan, white firefighters brought a lawsuit of
their own, claiming that the plan violated their civil rights. Id. at 759-60. The city argued that the
white firefighters should be barred from filing suit because they did not intervene in the initial lawsuit.
Id. at 762. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that the white firefighters were not precluded from
bringing suit. Id. at 762-63,769. The Court reasoned as follows:
A voluntary settlement in the form of a consent decree between one group of employees and
their employer cannot possibly "settle," voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of another
group of employees who do not join in the agreement. This is true even if the second group of
employees is a party to the litigation: "[P]arties who choose to resolve litigation through settlement
may not dispose of the claims of a third party ... without that party's agreement. A court's ap-
proval of a consent decree between some of the parties therefore cannot dispose of the valid
claims of nonconsenting intervenors."
Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
The outcome of Martin v. Wilks does not, as a matter of doctrine, contradict the current practice of
binding absent class members by the terms of a settlement to which they never consented. Despite the
italicized dictum in the above quotation, the white firefighters in Wilks were not parties to the original
class action; whereas absent class members are parties to the class action whose settlement binds them.
But to rely upon that distinction is to elevate form over substance. The reason it matters that the
white firefighters were not parties to the original action is that requiring them to intervene places a
burden on them that they should not have to shoulder. Id. at 763-64. Even if they know of the law-
suit, it would be unfair to require them to take affirmative steps to protect their rights. Id. at 765. The
same reasoning applies with equal force to absent class members when, as in Wilks, a class action set-
tles.
150. See Monaghan, supra note 108, at 1149.
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on consumers and employees.151 Others see class actions as a rare and
valuable means of leveling the playing field between such corporations
and the individuals they harm or exploit. t5 2 Those in the first camp urge
measures that would make class lawsuits more difficult or less lucrative
for plaintiffs' lawyers, whereas those in the second camp resist such
measures.
Such disagreements mask, however, a more basic common ground.
Most courts and commentators presumably favor meritorious class law-
suits while disfavoring frivolous ones. They simply disagree about the
relative prevalence and importance of the two sorts of cases. Up to this
point, the academic and jurisprudential clashes have concerned issues
where a policy choice would either encourage or burden both frivolous
and meritorious class actions. 53 The opt-in proposal presented here, by
contrast, seeks to discourage the frivolous while enhancing the meritori-
ous. It discourages plaintiffs' lawyers from bringing frivolous lawsuits
because it conditions their reward upon success at trial, and it benefits
class members with meritorious claims, because they receive the fair out-
come of adjudication rather than the rigged outcome of class settlement.
Defendants who have done nothing wrong will benefit from the new dis-
incentive for plaintiffs to sue them without justification, whereas defen-
dants who have wronged large numbers of people will be held more ac-
countable.
151. See Coffee, supra note 8, at 371-72 ("Correspondingly, where the plaintiffs' attorney was
once seen as a public-regarding private attorney general, increasingly the more standard depiction is as
a profit-seeking entrepreneur, capable of opportunistic actions and often willing to subordinate the
interests of class members to the attorney's own economic self-interest."); Green, supra note 112, at
1775 ("More practically, from the defendants' perspective, class actions are the ultimate weapon of
legal terrorism, launched by litigation-mad, bottom-feeding, money-hungry, professional plaintiffs'
lawyers.").
152. E.g., Lahav, supra note 11, at 70.
153. Notice requirements are a classic example. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156,
173 (1974); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15 (1950); Marcus, supra
note 9, at 889; Stephen C. Yeazell, The Past and Future of Defendant and Settlement Classes in Collec-
tive Litigation, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 687, 697 (1997) ("In fact, within the plaintiffs' bar this [notice] re-
quirement is seen with deep suspicion, as a procedural hurdle erected chiefly for the purpose-or at
any rate with the predictable result-of making impossible many claims that might be both meritori-
ous and viable were it not for this requirement.").
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